

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0392

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS

NOVEMBER 5, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0391

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF
INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS NOVEMBER 5, 1974.
PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH 5 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED
REFTEL.

6. UK REP AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. HE SAID
THAT AT LAST INFORMAL MEETING ON OCTOBER 29 HE HAD HAD
OCCASION TO COMMENT ON THE VARIOUS LEAKS ABOUT THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS MADE IN THESE INFORMAL MEETINGS WHICH

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HAD APPEARED IN THE PRESS DURING THE PREVIOUS WEEK. AS

HE HAD SAID AT THE TIME, WESTERN REPS WERE AWARE THAT THESE LEAKS CAME FROM A SOURCE IN ONE OF THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS. WESTERN REPS WERE GLAD TO NOTE THAT, AT THE PRESS BRIEFING AFTER LAST WEEK'S PLENARY MEETING, THE OFFICIAL SOVIET SPOKESMAN WAS CAREFUL TO AVOID REVEALING ANY DETAILS OF THE CONTENTS OF THE PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV'S STATEMENT. IN HIS POST-PLENARY COMMENTS ON THIS STATEMENT, THE SOVIET SPOKESMAN HAD REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT VIOLATING THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF THE TALKS. WESTERN REPS WERE THEREFORE ALL THE MORE DISAPPOINTED TO OBSERVE THAT A NUMBER OF DETAILS ABOUT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY LEAKED TO THE PRESS, AGAIN FROM EASTERN SOURCES. HE REGRETTED ONCE AGAIN HAVING TO DRAW EAST'S ATTENTION TO THIS DEPARTURE FROM THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULE WHICH APPLIED EQUALLY TO PLENARY AS TO INFORMAL MEETINGS. WHEN ONE-SIDED ACCOUNTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE GIVEN TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS AND OTHER MEDIA, IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT WESTERN SPOKESMEN SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW WAS EQUALLY REFLECTED. THE PUBLIC DEBATE TO WHICH THIS COULD EASILY LEAD, WOULD NOT, AS HE WAS SURE EAST WOULD AGREE, CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. SO WESTERN REPS HOPED EAST WOULD AGREE THAT FUTURE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH MUTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS, REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.

7. UK REP SAID HE WISHED TO TURN TO MORE SUBSTANTIVE SUBJECTS. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, HE CONTINUED THAT, AT THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, THE TWO SIDES HAD HAD A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE ALLIED SUGGESTION FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND ON THE REASONS WHY IT MADE SENSE TO HAVE A DISCUSSION OF DATA AT THIS STAGE. THE WEST BELIEVED IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PURSUE THESE TOPICS FURTHER NOW, WITH THE OBJECT OF CLARIFYING IDEAS THAT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT HAVE ON THEM. SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD BE ON A PURELY INFORMAL BASIS, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF EITHER SIDE, AS KHLESTOV HAD SUGGESTED ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION.

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8. UK REP, SAID, TO REVIEW WHERE MATTERS NOW STOOD; EARLIER IN THESE TALKS, IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST'S REQUEST ON MARCH 25 THAT THE WESTERN REPS EXPLAIN WHAT THEY MEANT BY THE TERM "GROUND FORCES", ALLIED REPS HAD DESCRIBED THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES THAT THE WEST HAD USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPUTING THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS THE WEST HAD PUT FORWARD. THE EAST THEN HAD CALLED ATTENTION TO DIFFERENCES IN THE WAY CERTAIN

COUNTRIES IN THE AREA HAD ORGANIZED THEIR GROUND FORCES. THE EAST HAD SAID THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD DEALT UNFAIRLY WITH THESE DIFFERENCES UNDER THE WESTERN DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. KHLESTOV HAD SAID ON MARCH 25 AND ON SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS THAT, WHEN GROUND FORCES WERE BEING DISCUSSED, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE ON WHAT WAS MEANT AND ON A COMMON DEFINITION SO EVERYONE WOULD HAVE THE SAME CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT TROOPS WERE MEANT ON EACH SIDE. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION ON APRIL 1, THE WEST HAD AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR BOTH SIDES TO ENGAGE IN THE EFFORT TO AGREE ON A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES.

9. UK REP CONTINUED THAT, IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN CRITICISMS, THE WESTERN REPS HAD SAID ON OCTOBER 15 THAT THEY CONSIDERED A DEFINITION BASED ON THE UNIFORM WORN WOULD BE THE SIMPLEST, BUT THAT, IN ORDER TO MOVE TOWARD A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, THEY WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS, WHICH THEY DESCRIBED. THE WEST HAD ALSO ONCE AGAIN SUGGESTED AN EXCHANGE OF DATE TO IDENTIFY THE DIFFERENCES THAT APPARENTLY EXISTED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AS TO TOTALS, WITH A VIEW TO REACHING A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS WERE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

10. UK REP STATED THE WEST HAD POINTED OUT THAT, FOR SEVERAL REASONS, SUCH A DISCUSSION WOULD BE IN THE EAST'S INTERESTS. IN THIS SENSE, WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT, IF POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND-BASED TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WERE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM AN AGREED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, AND WARSAW PACT GROUP SUPPORT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL INCLUDED, THERE WOULD BE A SIZEABLE DECREASE IN THE EASTERN GROUND FORCE TOTAL WHICH

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WOULD BE USED AS A BASIS FOR COMPUTING OVERALL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. THERE WOULD BE NO DECREASE ON THE WESTERN SIDE. THEREFORE, THIS POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD LESSEN THE REDUCTIONS THE EAST WOULD MAKE TO REACH A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES.

11. UK REP SAID THAT THE WEST HAD ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT, IF DISCUSSION OF DATA PRODUCED OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE FIGURE FOR TOTAL EASTERN GROUND FORCES WHICH THE WEST HAD GIVEN THE EAST WAS TOO HIGH, AND THAT THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS OF THE TWO SIDES WAS CONSEQUENTLY LESS THAN THE ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED THEN THE WEST WOULD NOT ASK THE EAST TO REDUCE MORE THAN WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REACH A COMMON CEILING. THE WEST HAD SUGGESTED THAT AN EXCHANGE

OF DATA COULD LEAD TO AGREEMENT ON THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS
ON BOTH SIDES AND THAT THIS IN TURN MIGHT MAKE IT
EASIER TO AGREE ON REDUCTIONS.

12. UK REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD ALSO NOTED THAT ANY
APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS REQUIRED SOME MEASURE OF AGREEMENT
ON DATA, LEAVING ASIDE FOR THE MOMENT THE QUESTION OF AT
WHAT STAGE THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE. ON THE BASIS OF PAST
DISCUSSIONS AT INFORMAL SESSIONS, AMONG THEM THOSE WHICH
HAD TAKEN PLACE ON MARCH 14, MARCH 18, AND APRIL 8, BOTH
SIDES HAD APPEARED TO AGREE THAT THEY WOULD AT SOME POINT
HAVE TO REACH SOME CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON TOTALS OF
EXISTING FORCES AS THE STARTING POINT, THE SIZE OF THE
AGREED REDUCTIONS, AND WHAT THE RESULTING FORCE TOTALS
WOULD BE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD MAINTAIN. THEREFORE, THE
WEST HAD BELIEVED THERE WAS COMMON AGREEMENT THAT SOME
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON ALL THREE SETS OF FIGURES WOULD BE
NECESSARY.

13. UK REP CONTINUED, THAT IF BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT IT
WAS NECESSARY TO COME TO SOME UNDERSTANDING ON THESE

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THREE SETS OF FIGURES, THEN THERE ONLY REMAINED THE QUESTION OF AT WHAT POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THIS SHOULD BE DONE. THE EAST HAD SAID THIS SHOULD BE DONE AFTER CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN RESOLVED. THE WEST, HOWEVER, THOUGHT IT TO THE ADVANTAGE OF BOTH SIDES THAT IT BE DONE NOW RATHER THAN LATER BECAUSE IT COULD HELP LEAD TO AGREEMENT ON THE OVERALL REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES. THE ALLIED REPS THEREFORE WISHED TO URGE THE EASTERN REPS TO REFLECT ON WHETHER THE WEST WAS NOT RIGHT IN THIS MATTER.

14. UK REP SAID, FOR REASONS STATED, WESTERN REPS ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ACCURACY AND AUTHORITY OF ALLIED FIGURES. WESTERN REPS CONTINUED TO THINK THAT, SUBJECT TO THE MINOR ADJUSTMENTS THEY HAD TOLD THE EAST ABOUT ON THE SECRET

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LAST OCCASION, THE FIGURES THE WEST HAD GIVEN EARLIER TO THE EAST WERE CORRECT. BUT THE EAST HAD CHALLENGED THE ACCURACY OF THESE FIGURES AND HAD ASSERTED THAT THEY WERE WRONG. THE ALLIED REPS WERE READY TO DISCUSS THIS POINT. THE WEST HAD OFFERED TO EXCHANGE FIGURES IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE BASIS OF THE APPARENT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE EAST'S TOTALS AND THE WEST'S. THUS, THE WEST THOUGHT AN EXCHANGE OF DATA WOULD BE OPPORTUNE AND IN THE EAST'S INTEREST AS WELL AS THE WEST'S.

15. UK REP SAID THAT THE EAST HAD SUGGESTED AT THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION THAT, IF THE WEST NOW FELT THERE WERE INCONSISTENCIES IN ITS OWN DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, THE WEST SHOULD SIMPLY PROCEED TO MAKE CORRESPONDING ADJUSTMENTS IN ITS GROUND FORCE TOTALS FOR THE WARSAW PACT. ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT TO DO THIS WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE. THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN EXCLUDING A SIZEABLE GROUP OF WARSAW PACT PERSONNEL FROM THE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL IF REDUCTIONS WERE NOT GOING TO BE LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES AND BASED ON THE NEW TOTAL AFTER THIS EXCLUSION. IF THE EAST DID NOT AGREE THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES, THEN THERE WAS NO POINT IN MAKING THE ADJUSTMENT.

16. UK REP COMMENTED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD SAID IN THIS CONNECTION DURING THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION THAT THEY MAINTAINED THEIR POSITION REGARDING REDUCTION OF AIR

FORCES. THE WEST WAS AWARE OF THE EAST'S POSITION, BUT IN LAST WEEK'S INFORMAL SESSION, THE ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD NOT BE OFFSET IF AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THIS WAS BECAUSE, UNDER THE PRESENT WESTERN DEFINITION BASED ON THE UNIFORM PRINCIPLE, THE AGGREGATE AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS ON THE TWO SIDES WERE VERY NEARLY EQUAL, THOUGH WITH A SLIGHT WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY.

17. UK REP SAID THAT IF THE EAST DISAGREED WITH THE FOREGOING POINT, THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED, ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, TO EXCHANGE AGGREGATE AIR PERSONNEL TOTALS FOR BOTH SIDES. THE ALLIES BELIEVED THEIR FIGURES WERE ACCURATE.

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THUS, TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION BASE WOULD NOT NARROW THE OVERALL MANPOWER DISPARITY. INDEED, IT WOULD SLIGHTLY INCREASE IT. THE MAIN MANPOWER DISPARITY CONTINUED TO BE IN THE GROUND FORCES, AND THAT WAS WHERE THE TWO SIDES SHOULD CONTINUE TO DIRECT THEIR ATTENTION.

18. UK REP SAID, ON THE BASIS OF THESE POINTS, THE WEST THOUGHT THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MOVE AHEAD TO AGREE ON A DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND TO EXCHANGE DATA. UK REP INVITED EAST'S COMMENTS ON THIS POINTS.

19. KHLESTOV REQUESTED A BREAK FOR CONSULTATION WITH HIS WARSAW PACT COLLEAGUES WHICH LASTED OVER A HALF AN HOUR.

20. ON RETURN KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS ON UK REP'S REMARKS. THE EASTERN POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF DATA AND OF A GROUND FORCE DEFINITION HAD BEEN CLEAR ALL ALONG IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. AT THE MOST RECENT INFORMAL SESSION ON OCTOBER 29, EASTERN REPS HAD REITERATED THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION ON THAT QUESTION. THEY HAD POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FIRST TO SETTLE THE OPEN QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE: WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET AND WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED, AND SO ON. THIS HAD BEEN THE POSITION OF THE EAST THROUGHOUT ALL STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING MARCH AND APRIL, AS WELL AS IN EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENTS.

21. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES THEMSELVES HAD PRESENTED SOME FIGURES ON GROUND FORCES. BUT AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF DATA AS SUCH. RATHER, WHAT THE EAST HAD DONE IN SEVERAL INFORMAL SESSIONS WAS TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE WEST TO VARIOUS QUESTIONS CONCERNING METHODS OF COUNTING

TROOPS IN THE AREA. FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES, ESPECIALLY THE US REP ON OCTOBER 15, EASTERN REPS HAD HEARD THAT THE WESTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT, IN WORKING OUT THE WESTERN GROUND FORCE DEFINITION, SOME INCONSISTENCIES HAD ARISEN. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS HAD SAID AT THAT TIME THAT, IF THE WESTERN REPS THEMSELVES BELIEVED THAT THE FIGURES THEY HAD GIVEN TO THE EAST

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WERE NOT CORRECT, IT WAS UP TO THEM TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN THOSE FIGURES. THE EAST MAINTAINED THIS POSITION.

22. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT, SINCE EASTERN REPS HAD NOT PARTICIPATED IN ANY DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF DATA IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS, THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT UK REP'S POINT THAT THE IDEAS EXPRESSED BY BOTH SIDES ON THIS SUBJECT HAD LED TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT AS TO THE TYPES OF DATA TO BE DISCUSSED AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE. HE HAD IN MIND SPECIFICALLY THE STATEMENT BY UK REP TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS IF PARTICIPANTS WOULD EXCHANGE AND AGREE ON THREE SETS OF DATA. THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS STATEMENT, BECAUSE NO DISCUSSION OF THAT TOPIC HAD EVER TAKEN PLACE. CONCLUSIONS OF THIS TYPE COULD ONLY BE DRAWN WHEN A SPECIFIC SUBJECT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. SINCE THE SUBJECT OF DATA HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED, NO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IT WERE JUSTIFIED. THE EASTERN POSITION WAS THAT ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE PERTAINING TO REDUCTIONS MUST FIRST BE CONSIDERED AND RESOLVED BEFORE DATA WAS DISCUSSED. EASTERN REPS HAD ADVANCED VALID ARGUMENTS WHY THEY BELIEVED THEY WERE RIGHT IN CONTINUING TO ADHERE TO THIS POSITION.

23. KHESTOV SAID HE DID WISH TO POSE ONE QUESTION TO THE UK REP ARISING FROM LATTER'S REMARKS. HE WISHED TO SAY IN ADVANCE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS POINT WAS LINKED DIRECTLY

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FROM US REP MBFR

WITH THE BASIC ISSUE OF REDUCTIONS RATHER THAN DATA. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM UK REP'S REMARKS THAT THE WESTERN SIDE MIGHT NOW BE WILLING TO AGREE TO CONSIDER REDUCTIONS OF ALL FORCES IN THE AREA, GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES, AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM ALLIED REPS WHETHER THIS IMPRESSION WAS CORRECT.

24. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, BEFORE ALLIED REPS REPLIED TO THIS QUESTION, HE WOULD LIKE TO REPLY TO UK REP'S REMARKS ABOUT PRESS LEAKS. HE WISHED TO REMIND HIS DISTINGUISHED WESTERN COLLEAGUES THAT EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF THE WESTERN REPS TO THE FACT THAT THE WEST WAS RESPONSIBLE, NOT ONLY FOR PRESS LEAKS, BUT ALSO ON SOME OCCASIONS, WESTERN REPS HAD EVEN GIVEN INFORMATION ON THE NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTLY TO THE PRESS THDOSELVES. HE HAD OBJECTED TO THIS SECRET

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PRACTICE TWICE AT THE END OF THE LAST RTNSFM IXNETHELESS, RIGHT AT THE START OF THE PRESENT ROUND, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN LEAKING INFORMATION TO THE PRESS. HE WOULD NOT CITE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES BUT VARIOUS METHODS HAD BEEN USED. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME ARTICLES WHICH APPEARED IN THE WESTERN PRESS COMMENTING ON THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS REFERRED TO ARTICLES IN THE EASTERN PRESS WHICH DID NOT EXIST.

25. KHESTOV SAID THAT, AS FAR AS PRESS BRIEFINGS BY DELEGATION OFFICIALS WERE CONCERNED, IN THE PAST, BRIEFINGS HAD BEEN OF A FORMAL NATURE AND ONLY THE SPEAKERS IN PLENARY SESSIONS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED. BUT NOW, MORE AND MORE INFORMATION WAS BEING GIVEN OUT AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE PLENARY STATEMENTS. ONE EXAMPLE WAS THAT, AFTER THE OCTOBER 24 PLENARY, IN WHICH THE FRG REPRESENTATIVE HAD SPOKEN, THERE HAD BEEN PRESS REPORTS COVERING THE CONTENT OF THIS STATEMENT. EASTERN REPS HAD MADE IT CLEAR ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT EASTERN REPS WOULD CONTINUE TO CONFORM TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE WEST WOULD DO THE SAME. THEREFORE, EAST BELIEVED THAT THE WEST SHOULD PREVENT ANY PRESS LEAKS AND ESTABLISH SOME REASONABLE LIMITS AND RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT WAS GIVEN TO THE PRESS. WESTERN REPS HAD TOLD THE EAST IN THE PAST THAT SOME INFORMATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS AND THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO AVOID GIVING ANY AT ALL. EASTERN REPS WERE AWARE THAT SOME MINIMAL AMOUNT OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS, BUT THIS SHOULD INDEED BE MINIMAL. EASTERN REPS SHARED THE VIEW THAT IT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR PARTICIPANTS TO HAVE THEIR RESPECTIVE PRESS REPRESENTATIVES ENGAGE IN VERBAL BATTLES IN FRONT OF THE PRESS BY WAY OF EXPLAINING THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPOSALS. UK REP HAD POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS THE BEHAVIOR THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH SIDES WERE FALLING INTO IN THESE PRESS BRIEFINGS. HE BELIEVED THE WHOLE MATTER DEPENDED PRIMARILY ON THE LINE THAT THE WEST CHOSE TO PURSUE.

26. UK REP SAID HE WISHED TO DEAL BRIEFLY WITH THE LAST POINT MADE BY KHESTOV. ALLIED REPS HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF EVERYTHING KHESTOV HAD SAID. THEY WELCOMED WHAT KHESTOV HAD SAID ABOUT THE CONFIDENTIALITY

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RULE AND THE EASTERN INTENTION TO OBSERVE THAT RULE. AS HE HAD MENTIONED, ALLIED REPS HAD BEEN PLEASED THAT THE SOVIET PRESS REPRESENTATIVE HAD MADE THE SAME POINT FOLLOWING THE PLENARY SESSION ON OCTOBER 31, BECAUSE THEY ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS RULE. HE WAS GLAD TO NOTE FROM KHESTOV'S REMARKS THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE IN FACT IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT.

27. UK REP CONTINUED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF WHO HAD LEAKED FIRST. HE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE FACT THAT, WHILE KHESTOV HAD CRITICIZED LEAKS FROM THE WEST, HE HAD NOT ATTEMPTED TO DENY THAT THERE HAD BEEN LEAKS FROM THE EAST. ALLIED REPS AGREED WITH KHESTOV THAT IT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC BATTLE OF POSITIONS AND THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO THE SERIOUS

PROGRESS ALL WISHED TO SEE.

28. US DEPREP SAID HE BELIEVED ALLIES HAD MAINTAINED A GOOD RECORD ABOUT THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THEY HAD PUT FORWARD. THEY HAD PUT FORWARD SIX OR SEVEN PROPOSALS AND, AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THE CONTENT OF THESE PROPOSALS HAD NOT BEEN REVEALED. OESER AND STRULAK SAID THIS HAD NOT BEEN THE CASE. THERE HAD BEEN TREATMENT IN THE WESTERN PRESS OF ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR A FREEZE AND OTHER SPECIFICS.

29. UK REP SAID HE NOW WISHED TO ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION KHLESTOV HAD JUST PUT TO HIM. KHLESTOV HAD SAID THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST NOW AGREED TO COVER ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND HAD ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS A CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF UK REP'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. THE SHORT ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WAS NO. IT WAS THE WESTERN VIEW, AS THE ALLIED REPS HAD EXPLAINED MANY TIMES, THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM PARTICIPANTS HAD TO DEAL WITH IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. THERE WERE OTHER DISPARITIES IN THE AREA WITH WHICH ALLIES BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS ALSO SHOULD DEAL, BUT UK REP WAS CONCERNED AT THE MOMENT WITH THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. TO DEAL WITH THIS DISPARITY AND TO ELIMINATE IT IT WAS NECESSARY TO KNOW WHAT WAS MEANT BY THE TERM "GROUND FORCE MANPOWER."

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THIS WAS WHY WEST HAD SUGGESTED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND HAD DONE SO IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION KHLESTOV HIMSELF HAD ASKED AS LONG AGO AS MARCH 25.

30 UK REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIED REPS HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT VARIOUS COMMENTS EAST HAD MADE REGARDING THE GROUND FORCE DEFINITION THEY HAD GIVEN AND WHICH ALLIES STILL CONSIDERED THE SIMPLEST DEFINITION, THAT OF USING THE CRITERION OF UNIFORM. IN ORDER TO ANSWER EASTERN COMMENTS, ALLIED REPS HAD SUGGESTED SOME MODIFICATIONS TO THEIR DEFINITION WHICH WOULD INVOLVE EXCLUDING FROM THE WESTERN DEFINITION CERTAIN FORCES ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE. BUT, AS HE HAD EXPLAINED, ALLIES WERE DOING THIS IN ORDER TO TRY TO REACH, AS THE EAST HAD SUGGESTED EARLIER, A COMMON, AGREED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN ALLIES DOING THIS UNLESS THE REDUCTIONS

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FROM US REP MBFR

PARTICIPANTS WERE TALKING OF WOULD BE IN GROUND FORCES
AND THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED WOULD BE TAKEN FROM TOTALS
BASED ON THE AGREED DEFINITION. HE HOPED THERE WAS
NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT AND HOPED THAT IT WAS NOT
BEING CONFUSED WITH THE FURTHER POINT ALLIES HAD MADE REGARDING
AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

31. UK REP CONTINUED THAT ONE OF THE EASTERN CRITICISMS
OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY TO
REACH AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER
WAS THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO AIR AND NUCLEAR
FORCES IN THE AREA. ALLIED REPS HAD SAID -- AND THIS WAS
A DIFFERENT POINT FROM HIS EARLIER POINT -- THAT AIR
FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA WAS APPROXIMATELY EQUAL ON
BOTH SIDES, WITH A SLIGHT SUPERIORITY ON THE WARSAW PACT
SIDE. TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AIR FORCE MANPOWER FIGURES

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WOULD NOT AFFECT THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TO WHICH ALLIES ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE. RATHER, IT WOULD INCREASE IT. BUT ALLIES HAD OFFERED, BOTH IN THE CASE OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AND IN THE CASE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER, TO EXCHANGE DATA WITH THE EAST ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, TO SEE WHAT SORT OF FIGURES EACH SIDE HAD AND TO TRY TO FIND WHERE THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WERE.

32. UK REP SAID THESE FIGURES WOULD INCLUDE FIGURES FOR MANPOWER IN NUCLEAR FORCES. THESE PERSONNEL WERE ALREADY INCLUDED IN WESTERN GROUND AND AIR FORCE TOTALS. THE PERSONNEL OF UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE NOT CARRIED AS A SEPARATE ITEM.

33. UK REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE ONE FINAL POINT. KHLESTOV HAD STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO UNDERSTANDING TO EXCHANGE DATA ON THE THREE SETS OF FIGURES UK REP HAD MENTIONED IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. HOWEVER, IN AN INFORMAL SESSION AS LONG AGO AS MARCH 18, UK REP HAD REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE FIGURES IN THE THREE CATEGORIES HE HAD MENTIONED ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. PARTICIPANTS HAD HAD SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT AND, AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING ON THE 8TH OF APRIL, KHLESTOV HAD HIMSELF AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY AT A CERTAIN POINT TO REACH UNDERSTANDING ON DATA. KHLESTOV HAD SAID THEN THAT, BEFORE DATA WAS EXCHANGED, IT WOULD IN HIS VIEW BE NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN PRINCIPLES. ALLIED REPS HAD EXPLAINED THEN WHY THEY DID NOT THINK THIS WAS PRACTICAL AND WHY EXCHANGE OF DATA WOULD HELP PARTICIPANTS MAKE PROGRESS ON THE METHODS AND AMOUNTS OF REDUCTIONS. IN HIS REMARKS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, UK REP HAD EXPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN THIS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ABOUT THE TIMING OF DISCUSSION OF DATA, BUT HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE FOR BOTH SIDES IN HAVING AN EARLY EXCHANGE AND IN REACHING AN AGREED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, AND HE HAD ASKED EAST TO REFLECT WHETHER ALLIES MIGHT NOT BE RIGHT IN SUGGESTING THIS.

34. US DEPREP SAID THAT THE ALLIES CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN
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THEIR POSITION THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE IN GROUND FORCES ONLY. HOWEVER, THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM THE REMARKS OF UK REP WAS THAT THE ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS DATA TOTALS BOTH ON GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES, THAT WAS, ALL THE FORCES IN THE AREA EXCEPT THE NAVY. THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF EITHER SIDE AS TO WHAT KIND OF FORCES

SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS. IT SEEMED CLEAR, BECAUSE THE EAST WAS NOT PREPARED TO MOVE ON THIS POINT AT THE MOMENT, THAT NO AGREEMENT COULD BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF FORCES SHOULD BE

REDUCED. BUT THIS FACT NEED NOT HINDER A DISCUSSION OF DATA ON ALL FORCES IN THE AREA WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE SOON. ITS RESULTS MIGHT ADVANCE THE PROCESS OF AGREEMENT.

35. US DEPREP POINTED OUT THAT THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973, FORESAW THE FIXING OF SPECIFIC NUMERICAL AMOUNTS OF REDUCTIONS AND ALSO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE LEVEL OF FORCES REMAINING AFTER REDUCTIONS. IT SEEMED EVIDENT IN THE LATTER CASE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH COMMITMENTS ON MAINTAINING LEVELS WITHOUT QUANTIFYING THESE LEVELS AND PUTTING THEM IN THE FORM OF NUMBERS TO BE RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES. THEREFORE, IF THE EAST CONSIDERED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE ON THE NUMBERS OF REDUCTIONS, PLUS RESIDUAL LEVELS NOT TO BE EXCEEDED, IT WAS MANIFEST THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON STARTING TOTALS WOULD ALSO BE NEEDED. INDEED, SUCH A TOTAL COULD EVEN BE CONSTRUCTED FROM THE FIGURES THE EAST APPARENTLY ENVISAGED WOULD BE INCLUDED IN ITS DRAFT AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, APPARENTLY THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THE NECESSITY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE THREE TYPES OF DATA UK REP HAD MENTIONED AND THE PRESENT WAS AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO START WITH THIS EXCHANGE.

36. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO THANK UK REP FOR THE ANSWER HE HAD GIVEN TO HIS QUESTION. AS FOR EASTERN POSITION AS TO WHY THERE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE ANY UNDERSTANDING ON DATA, HE DID NOT WISH TO REPEAT HIS EARLIER REMARKS.

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FROM US REP MBFR

37. POLISH REP SAID HE WISHED TO ENRICH THE DISCUSSION BY PASSING ON TO DISCUSSION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 15, WHICH HAD BEEN REPEATED IN THE PLENARY SESSION OF OCTOBER 31. IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS IN 1975, WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF WESTERN CONCERNS AND INTERESTS, EASTERN REPS HAD HOPED FOR A FRUITFUL DISCUSSION OF THEIR PROPOSAL IN WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO ACHIEVE QUICK AGREEMENT ON A PRACTICAL BEGINNING OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS. AFTER ALL, BOTH SIDES HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR RAPID PROGRESS. AFTER A YEAR OF NEGOTIATIONS, THERE CONTINUED TO BE A WIDE DIVERGENCE IN THE OVERALL APPROACH OF BOTH SIDES. THE ONLY WAY OUT SEEMED TO BE TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, WHILE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE BASIC POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES, COULD OPEN THE WAY TO SECRET

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MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

38. POLISH REP SAID THE EAST'S CAREFUL AND CONTINUING ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSES FROM WESTERN REPS THUS FAR DID NOT INDICATE THAT THE LATTER HAD ENTERED ON MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THIS DID NOT ACCORD WITH EASTERN EXPECTATIONS. IT DID NOT FIT WITH

WESTERN ASSURANCES OF FLEXIBILITY AND WESTERN STATEMENTS OF DESIRE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE MOVES WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, A POINT MOST RECENTLY MADE BY US REP IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 31. INDEED, WHAT HAD BEEN THE ACTUAL WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL? THAT ANSWER WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO SUPPORT A PRECONCEIVED NEGATIVE ANSWER THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THIS FORMAL, READY-MADE ANSWER SEEMED DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A COVER FOR WESTERN RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ON ITS MERITS. BUT ONLY SUCH DISCUSSION COULD LEAD TO A PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME. IT WAS NOT ADEQUATE MERELY TO SAY THAT, BECAUSE THE PRESENT EASTERN APPROACH DID NOT DIFFER FROM PROPOSALS RAISED SOME TIME AGO, IT WAS NO GOOD. THIS WAS NOT A PRODUCTIVE METHOD. IT WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE TO ASK HOW THE EASTERN PROPOSAL MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SITUATION AND HOW IT COULD BE SHAPED TO DO SO BETTER. SOME PASSING WESTERN REMARKS ON POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD NOT SUFFICE IN THIS REGARD, ESPECIALLY IF THEY WERE DROWNED IN A FLOOD OF NEGATIVE CRITICISM. ALLIED REPS HAD CONCENTRATED ON SAYING HOW BAD THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS. THEY HAD NOT SAID HOW IT COULD BE MADE BETTER. EASTERN REPS HAD NOT HEARD ANY WORDS FROM THE WEST SUCH AS "AMENDMENT" OR "ADDITION" TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. WESTERN REPS HAD NOT EVEN SAID THEY WERE WILLING TO JOIN EASTERN REPS IN AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. IN FACT THEY HAD DONE NOTHING EXCEPT TO COMPARE THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL WITH EARLIER EASTERN PROPOSALS. BUT, AS THE FRENCH PROVERB STATED, A COMPARISON WAS NOT A REASON. INDEED, THE MAJOR WESTERN OBJECTION WAS THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT TAKE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT THE BASIC WESTERN POSITION AS REGARDS ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION, THE RESTRICTION OF REDUCTIONS TO GROUND FORCES, AND ON DIFFERING OBLIGATIONS FOR DIFFERENT

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PARTICIPANTS SEPARATED IN TIME AS REGARDS OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE BY THE USA AND USSR, AND THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. EASTERN REPS HAD PROVEN BEYOND ANY DOUBT WHY THIS APPROACH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. IT WAS CONTRARY TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND REFLECTED THE WESTERN EFFORT TO GAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS IN STRICT CONTRAST TO THE EQUITABLE EASTERN APPROACH. EASTERN REPS CONTINUED TO CONSIDER THEIR NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL EQUITABLE. THEY STUCK BY THIS PROPOSAL, BUT NEVERTHELESS THEY HAD COME OUT WITH A NEW PROPOSAL IN WHICH THEY HAD MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE THE WESTERN POSITION. EASTERN REPS WOULD LIKE WESTERN REPS TO SERIOUSLY APPRECIATE THIS CONCRETE MANIFESTATION OF EASTERN GOOD WILL. EASTERN REPS REALLY MEANT BUSINESS. THEY WANTED AGREE-

MENT ON AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP BY 1975. FOR THAT, THEY NEED A CONSTRUCTIVE WESTERN RESPONSE. HE WISHED TO CALL ON THE WESTERN REPS TO MAKE SUCH A RESPONSE.

39. US REP SAID THAT, AT THE MOST RECENT INFORMAL SESSION, ALLIED REPS HAD MADE THE POINT THAT, ALTHOUGH SOME DETAILS HAD BEEN SPECIFIED IN IT, THE CURRENT EASTERN "FIRST STEP" PROPOSAL OF LAST JUNE. POLISH REP HAD JUST CONFIRMED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS NOT NEW AS COMPARED WITH THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF LAST JUNE.

40. POLISH REP SAID THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN HIS POINT. HE HAD JUST ARGUED THAT IT WAS NOT PROPER TO DISCUSS THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SOLELY IN TERMS OF COMPRING IT WITH OTHER EASTERN PROPOSALS. RATHER, WESTERN REPS SHOULD DISCUSS THE CONTENT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. US REP ASKED WHETHER THAT CONTENT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTENT OF OTHER EASTERN PROPOSALS. POLISH REP SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFERENT IN THAT NOW IT WAS A FORMAL PROPOSAL AND HAD NOW BEEN TABLED. US REP ASKED WHAT ABOUT THE CONTENT? WHAT WAS DIFFERENT IN THIS? GDR REP SAID THE CONTENT WAS MORE CONCRETE AND SPECIFIC. IT CONTAINED FIGURES, IN WHICH THE ALLIED REPS SHOWED SUCH CONTINUED INTEREST. US REP SAID THAT IN THIS REGARD, THE PROPOSAL WAS A STEP BACKWARD. IN JUNE, EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET AND US COULD TAKE THE MAJORITY OF THE PROPOSED FIRST
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STEP REDUCTIONS. NOW THEY WERE ONLY TALKING ABOUT FIFTY PERCENT OF THE REDUCTIONS. WAS THIS THE DIFFERENCE TO WHICH THE GDR REP WAS REFERRING? HE COULD SEE THAT THE EAST CONSIDERED ITS PROPOSAL MORE FORMAL, BUT WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE AS REGARDED CONTENTS? SMIRNVOSKY SAID THAT EAST HAD MADE THE DIFFERENCES CLEAR. THIS STATEMENT OF US REP WAS A SURPRISING ONE. US REP SAID PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SINCE JUNE AND SOME PARTS OF IT SINCE MARCH. THEY HAD TOLD THE EAST WHY THEY DIDN'T LIKE ITS MAIN ASPECTS. NOW IT WAS BEING ADVANCED AGAIN DESPITE ALLIED CRITICISM MONTHS AGO. GDR REP SAID THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR PROVED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS THE ONLY WAY OUT, AND THAT THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE

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FROM US REP MBFR

WAS NOT TO HAVE THE FULL PROGRAM OF BOTH SIDES. US DEPREP SAID THE POINT WAS THAT THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL WAS BASED FOUR-SQUARE ON THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROGRAM. THIS WAS ITS MOST OBJECTIONABLE ASPECT.

41. DRAWING ON POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, US REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD, HOWEVER, CLAIMED THAT THE CURRENT EASTERN PROPOSAL DID REPRESENT A CHANGE FROM THE EAST'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF LAST NOVEMBER. EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT THE DIFFERENCES WERE THAT THE US AND USSR COULD IMPLEMENT THEIR REDUCTIONS FIRST, THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT'S SHARE IN THE REDUCTIONS NEED NOT BE IN PROPORTION TO ITS SHARE OF THE TOTAL ARMED FORCES ON ITS SIDE, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE TWO SEPARATE PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS.

42. US REP SAID THAT THE WEST HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THESE DIFFERENCES. THE WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT IT WAS A POSITIVE FACT THAT THE
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EAST NOW ENVISAGED TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION AND THAT, IN PRACTICE,

THE EAST WAS WILLING TO PLACE THE US AND USSR IN A SEPARATE CATEGORY, ALTHOUGH ONLY FOR PURPOSES OF IMPLEMENTING AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. THE EAST HAD MOVED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BUT, AS THE WEST HAD POINTED OUT, NOT FAR ENOUGH. THE WEST HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF THE EAST'S PRESENT POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS EXACTLY THE SAME AS THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION IN NOVEMBER 1973. THE ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF THE EAST'S POSITION LAST NOVEMBER HAD BEEN THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE AND SHOULD ALSO COMMIT THEMSELVES AS TO THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE. THIS WAS STILL THE EASTERN POSITION.

43. THE US REP SAID THAT, AS THE EAST KNEW, THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN QUITE DIFFERENT. THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN THAT, AT THE OUTSET, ONLY THE US AND USSR SHOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE AND SHOULD UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS AS TO THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR FORCES UNTIL AFTER THE US AND USSR HAD REDUCED THEIR FORCES. NOW, TO MEET THE EAST'S CONCERNS, THE ALLIES HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION. TO MEET THE EASTERN CONCERN THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE, THE WEST HAD TOLD THE EAST THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, ALL THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EXCEPT LUXEMBOURG, NOW WERE WILLING -- BEFORE THE US AND USSR HAD CARRIED OUT ANY REDUCTIONS -- TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN A SECOND PHASE.

44. THE US REP SAID THAT, TO MEET THE EAST'S CONCERN REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS, THE ALLIES HAD TOLD THE EAST THAT THE WEST WAS READY IN A FIRST AGREEMENT TO AGREE ON A SPECIFIC NUMERICAL OUTCOME FOR PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE ALLIES HAD SAID THAT

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THIS, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE FORCE TOTALS THEY HAD PROVIDED THE EAST, WHICH THE WEST REMAINED READY TO DISCUSS WITH THE EAST ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE, AND TOGETHER WITH THE WEST'S PROPOSED PHASE I REDUCTIONS, WOULD SHOW THE TOTAL OF WESTERN REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. THEREFORE, ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOW HAD EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO MAKE COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE AND ON THE FINAL NUMERICAL OUTCOME. US REP SAID THE

WESTERN REPS HAD ALSO GIVEN THE EASTERN REPS SOME INDICATIONS AS TO TIMING, STATING THAT THE WEST EXPECTED A SECOND PHASE TO BE COMPLETED RAPIDLY AND HAD PROPOSED A MEANS OF DEALING WITH THE SITUATION IF, CONTRARY TO ALL EXPECTATION, THIS DID NOT COME ABOUT. THUS, THE WEST HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION AND MOVED TO THE MIDDLE GROUND REGARDING COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE AND ON THE FINAL NUMERICAL OUTCOME AND HAD DONE SOMETHING TO MEET THE EAST ON TIMING. THE EAST, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO ITS ORIGINAL POSITION THAT NO REDUCTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD UNDERTAKEN COMMITMENTS BOTH AS TO THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL AMOUNT AND AS TO THE TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS.

45. THE US REP SAID THAT, SINCE THE EAST'S NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL, THE EASTERN SIDE HAD MADE A LIMITED MOVE ON TIMING, IN THE FORM OF THE EAST'S SUGGESTION THAT, ALTHOUGH ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD STILL AGREE ON AMOUNTS AND TIMING BEFOREHAND, THE US AND SOVIETS COULD IMPLEMENT THEIR AGREED REDUCTIONS FIRST.

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FROM US REP MBFR

46. US REP SAID THAT POLISH REP HAD JUST REQUESTED ALLIED REPS TO SUGGEST MODIFICATIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. HE WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE SUCH AN AMENDMENT BECAUSE, IF THE EAST WOULD MOVE A STEP FURTHER, THIS WOULD BE A REAL ADVANCE. IF THE EAST WERE NOW WILLING TO AGREE THAT US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE SPECIFIC AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS, THEN THIS WOULD BE A MOVE TO THE MIDDLE GROUND AND WOULD LEAD TO FUTURE PROGRESS. ALLIED REPS WOULD LIKE EASTERN REPS REACTION TO THIS SUGGESTION.

47. GDR REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS. WHEN US REP HAD JUST SPOKEN OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, SAYING THAT THEY WOULD BE A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, THE GDR REP HAD MADE A QUESTION MARK ON

HIS NOTES. NOW THAT HE HAD HEARD THE REMAINDER OF THE US REP'S

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PRESENTATION, HE HAD TO CONFESS THERE WAS SOME LOGIC IN IT AS TO THE COURSE OF EVENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIONS WHICH IT DESCRIBED. BUT IN HIS VIEW, THIS WAS NOT THE PROPER WAY TO MOVE. IF PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO BASE THEMSELVES ON THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, AS HAD BEEN AGREED IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS, WESTERN REPS WOULD FIND IN ALL THE EASTERN PROPOSALS THAT THE LATTER WERE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY IN UNDERTAKING OBLIGATIONS, MUTUALITY IN MAKING AGREED REDUCTIONS, AND MUTUALITY IN CONFIDENCE. THEREFORE, THE RIGHT DIRECTION TO MOVE WAS IN THE DIRECT

ION
OF THE MUTUAL PARTICIPATION OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND THIS WAS THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE EAST EXPECTED MOVEMENT FROM THE WEST. FOR ITS PART, AS INDICATED IN US REP'S REMARKS, THE WEST EXPECTED THE EAST TO DEPART FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY. HE UNDERSTOOD THE FINAL CONCLUSION WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE US REP. THE LATTER WAS NOW ASKING EAST TO AGREE THAT, UNTIL THE US AND SOVIETS REDUCED, THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AS TO THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS.

48. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT THE GENERAL OBLIGATION JUST MENTIONED BY THE US REP WAS NOT A CONCRETE AND SPECIFIC OBLIGATION FOR REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. IT DID NOT OBLIGATE PARTICIPANTS AS TO SPECIFIC AMOUNTS AND TIMING. FURTHERMORE, IT DID NOT CORRESPOND WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF REDUCING BOTH ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BECAUSE IT DELIBERATELY OMITTED ANY COMMITMENT AS TO REDUCTION

OF ARMAMENTS. WHAT THEN REMAINED AS THE CONTENT OF THIS GENERAL FORMULA? IT WAS NOT A CONCRETE, INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION. RATHER, IT WAS A KIND OF PRECONDITION, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EAST HAD TO AGREE, FIRST TO THE PRINCIPLE OF REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES NOT ONLY FOR THE FIRST, BUT FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS. SECOND, THE EAST WAS EXPECTED TO AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS. THIRD, THE EAST WAS EXPECTED TO AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF REDUCING ONLY MANPOWER. IF THE EAST PURSUED THIS ANALYSIS FURTHER, IT PROBABLY WOULD FIND STILL MORE PRECONDITIONS. THIS APPROACH WAS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF OBLIGATIONS BASED ON MUTUALITY. USING THIS PRINCIPLE AS THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATION, AS HAD BEEN AGREED, THE EAST COULD SEE NO MOVE BY THE WEST TOWARDS INITIAL REDUCTIONS BASED ON MUTUALITY. THE WEST STILL WANTED ONLY
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THE US AND SOVIETS TO REDUCE. THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS STILL DID NOT WISH TO ASSUME ANY CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS AS REGARDS THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND THERE WAS NOTHING ON TIMING. ALL OF THESE POINTS ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL. HE DID NOT WISH TO REPEAT THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR, BUT IT HAD PROVEN THAT ANY PROGRESS WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS. THIS MEANT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE REDUCTIONS OF MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS. HOWEVER, SINCE IT HAD PROVEN DIFFIULT TO MOVE THE WEST TO AGREEMENT ON THE OVERALL EASTERN PROGRAM, IN WHICH EAST HAD PROPOSED A 15 PERCENT REDUCTION IN THREE YEARS, AND SINCE SOME WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT READY TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES, CONSEQUENTLY, THE QUESTION REMAINED HOW TO GET STARTED. WHAT REMAINED, THEN, WAS THE IDEA OF AN INITIAL STEP IN WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS COULD PROVE THEIR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THE FACT THAT THIS INITIAL STEP WAS LIMITED DID NOT REQUIRE EITHER SIDE TO ABANDON THEIR WHOLE PROGRAM. IT PROVIDED A POSSIBILITY

OF MOVING AHEAD WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FUTURE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT RESOLVED MANY OF THE PROBLEMS RAISED IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT SESSION. THIS THEN WAS A PRODUCTIVE PROPOSAL WHICH OPENED THE WAY FOR REAL MOVEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS. THIS VIEW HAD BEEN CONFIRMED ONCE AGAIN BY THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION ON THE PRESENT OCCASION.

49. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HE WANTED TO ADD TO US REPS REMARKS AND TO RESPOND TO STRULAK'S REQUEST THAT WEST

GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE EAST PROPOSAL AND ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT THE ALLIES HAD REPEATEDLY EXPLAINED THEIR OBJECTIONS TO VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL. SO FAR, THE EASTERN REPS HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING THAT WOULD CAUSE THE WEST TO DROP ANY OF THOSE OBJECTIONS. HOWEVER, THE ALLIES REMAINED WILLING TO DISCUSS ANY
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SUGGESTION THE EAST MIGHT HAVE FOR MAKING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. SO, IN ORDER TO HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THE WESTERN REPS WANTED TO ASK A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. THE WEST WANTED THE EAST TO UNDERSTAND THAT, AS THE EASTERN REPS SO OFTEN HAD POINTED OUT, THE ACT

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FROM US REP MBFR

OF ASKING QUESTIONS DID NOT INDICATE EITHER ACCEPTANCE OF OR SERIOUS INTEREST IN THE OTHER SIDE'S PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. THE WEST WAS MOTIVATED ONLY BY A DESIRE FOR INFORMATION AS TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

50. THE NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT, AS A FIRST QUESTION, THE EAST HAD PROPOSED THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS BE IMPLEMENTED IN TWO STAGES OVER A ONE-YEAR PERIOD. THE ALLIES HAD HEARD INFORMAL SUGGESTIONS FROM THE EASTERN SIDE THAT THIS PERIOD COULD BE EXTENDED TO TWO YEARS. COULD THIS PERIOD BE LONGER THAN TWO YEARS? WHAT WAS THE MAXIMUM TIME PERIOD THE EAST COULD ENVISAGE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF INITIAL REDUCTIONS?

51. THE NETHERLANDS REP SAID, SECOND, THE EAST HAD PROPOSED
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SYMMETIRCAL REDUCTIONS OF EQUAL NUMBERS OF MEN ON BOTH SIDES. BUT, IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS OF THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, EASTERN REPS HAD INDICATED THAT THE ACTUAL NUMBERS DID NOT NEED TO BE EQUAL ON THE TWO SIDES AND THAT THE EAST COULD CONTEMPLATE EQUAL PERCENTAGE RATHER THAN EQUAL NUMBER REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES HAD HEARD SIMILAR INFORMAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL. IN THIS CONTEXT, EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST WAS WILLING TO REDUCE MORE IN THOSE TYPES OF FORCES WHERE THE EAST HAD A SUPERIORITY. THIS WAS CERTAINLY THE CASE IN GROUND FORCES. WOULD THE EAST BE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER AND TO CONSIDER REDUCTIONS IN THE PROPORTIONS THE WEST HAD SUGGESTED FOR ITS PHASE I PROPOSAL?

52. THE NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT, THIRD, THE EAST HAD PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING DISTRIBUTION OF REDUCTIONS: THE US AND USSR WOULD EACH REDUCE BY 10,000 MEN, AND FOR INSTANCE, THE FRG AND POLAND MIGHT REDUCE BY 5,000 MEN EACH, AND THE REMAINING 5,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE WOULD BE DIVIDED UP AMONG THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE. HOWEVER, EASTERN REPS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WERE FLEXIBLE AS TO THESE SUGGESTED NUMBERS. THE ALLIES HAD NOTED THAT THE SOVIET SHARE OF THE REDUCTIONS ON THE EASTERN SIDE WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE PRESENT PROPORTION OF SOVIET FORCES TO TOTAL EASTERN FORCES IN THE AREA. COULD THE EAST CONSIDER HAVING THE SOVIET UNION TAKE A LARGE SHARE OF THE REDUCTIONS ON THE EASTERN SIDE? COULD THE SOVIET UNION TAKE ALL THESE REDUCTIONS?

53. KHLESTOV SAID THE REMARKS OF US REP AND NETHERLANDS

REP CLEARLY EXPECTED AN ANSWER. BUT, IN VIEW OF THE LATE HOUR, HE WISHED TO SUGGEST THAT THESE QUESTIONS BE DEALT WITH AT THE NEXT SESSION. UK REP AGREED. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT EASTERN REPS WOULD ALSO ADDRESS THE OPEN POINTS IN HIS OWN OPENING REMARKS AT THE NEXT SESSION.

54. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT SESSION AT 10 A.M. ON NOVEMBER 12. THE EAST WILL BE HOST.RESOR

SECRET

NNN

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